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Abstract 
This is a study of how a virtual technology burden was created that impacted the 
professional pilot college student and various colleges/universities that offer 
professional pilot degree programs.  A cascading set of events began as a result of 
U.S. congressional reaction to a tragic airline accident.  The resulting legislation 
forced the Federal Aviation Administration to publish new rules for first officer 
qualifications that were unmindful of the recommendations of professional pilot 
groups for simulation-based training.  Ultimately, this placed a financial burden 
on both the college/university training curriculum and on the professional pilot 
student. 
 
Description of the Project 
This paper investigates the impact of a fatal aircraft accident in the United States 
(the Cogan Airlines accident) on the virtual technology (aircraft simulation) used 
by colleges and universities in training airline pilots for service as first officers.  It 
examines the training profile used prior to the accident in question, the Cogan 
accident, the congressional reaction to it, the subsequent legislation, followed by 
the federal rule-making process leading to a new rule, and, finally, the 
implementation of that rule within a collegiate environment. 
 
The Use of Simulation in Airline Pilot Training Prior to the Cogan Accident 
The use of simulators in training airline pilots has long been recognized in the 
airline industry as an effective means to prepare a pilot to operate a particular type 
of an airplane.  It is a more cost effective means of training than operating the 
aircraft itself.  For example a Boeing 737 costs approximately $5,750 per flight 
hour to operate.  On the other hand, the full-flight simulator, which is highly 
specific to the airplane and has a data package that allows it to mimic the flight 
characteristics of the airplane, costs about $150 per flight hour to operate (P. 
Morton, personal communication, February 7, 2014).  So clearly, it makes sense 
to train as much as possible in the simulator.   
 
The economic equation for the use of sophisticated simulators is not quite so clear 
in the academic world of flight education where the mission is to prepare students 
for entry-level airline pilot positions.  In 2001, when Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University acquired its simulators for the Cessna 172, the cost per simulator was 
$379,000.  The cost of the actual airplane at that time was $200,000.  It’s 
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important to note here that the Cessna 172 simulators are actually non-motion 
devices called Flight Training Devices (FTDs).  These devices are specific to the 
airplane (level 6), have a data package as sophisticated as the full-flight 
simulators, and have a 2200 wrap-around visual.  These are the most sophisticated 
trainers in the world for the type of aircraft being simulated.  Thus, on the face of 
it, the airplane seems cheaper to operate than the FTD.  However, when one 
considers the fuel costs, the amount of time each day the airplane can be operated, 
and the wear and tear on the airframe and engine, the simulator has lower 
operating costs than the airplane - $78 per hour and $150 per hour, respectively.  
Additionally, the FTDs can be operated eighteen hours per day, need no fuel, and 
have very low maintenance costs. 
 
Brady and Macchiarella (2006) conducted a study to test the training value of 
these FTDs.  Twenty-six students were selected at random from an entering class 
of freshmen students in the Professional Pilot degree program.  These were the 
control group and flew the airplane (Cessna 172) for 100% of the private pilot 
syllabus.  Twenty-six other students were chosen at random as the experimental 
group.  They also flew the entire private pilot syllabus but with 60% of it flown in 
the FTD and 40% in the airplane.  All appropriate controls were observed to 
eliminate rater bias and to minimize nuisance variables.  At the end of the 
experiment, which was the achievement of the Private Pilot Certificate, it was 
determined that there was virtually no difference in the competencies of the 
control group and the experimental group.  Unmistakably, the experiment 
demonstrated that using a high percentage of very high fidelity simulation in a 
pilot training syllabus could dramatically reduce training costs, even at the Private 
Pilot level. 
 
Many university flight education programs wish to prepare students for entry into 
the airlines by using a capstone course in an FTD that simulates a jet aircraft used 
by the airlines, usually a Canadair Regional Jet or similar aircraft.  Full-flight 
simulators, which can cost upwards of $10 million, are usually too expensive for 
university programs and, prior to the Cogan accident, were not required in a 
collegiate program.   
 
Before that accident, pilots graduating from flight education degrees possessed 
the Private, Commercial, Instrument, and Multi-engine ratings and certificates, 
and had accumulated 250 to 350 flight hours.  With these qualifications they met 
the standards for entry into the first officer position (co-pilot) in an airline, usually 
a regional airline.  The marketplace for pilots was based on airline demand, which 
governed when a given pilot would be hired.  At times these new pilots were hired 
at 350 hours and at other times, the flight time was much higher, perhaps 1,200 to 
1,500 hours.  This variation in flight time was simply a function of demand as all 
pilots were qualified.   
 
A study was undertaken beginning in 2003 to determine which new-hire pilots 
performed the best in initial airline training.  It was important for the airlines to 
ICICTE 2014 Proceedings	   305	  
know this since additional training flights meant additional training costs for the 
airlines that they, of course, wished to avoid.  The study, which began as a Pilot 
Yield Study and eventually became the Pilot Source Study (Smith, 2010), 
involved six airlines and seven universities.  The study examined 2,156 first 
officer new hires to determine the “best” pilots.  Best was defined as those new-
hire pilots who had the fewest incomplete lessons or the fewest repeat lessons in 
new-hire training.  Three characteristics defined the best pilots, those who: (1) had 
been graduated from a flight education program in a four-year institution 
accredited by the Aviation Accreditation Board International, (2) had some 
experience as a flight instructor, and (3) had between 500 and 1000 flight hours. 
 
The Cogan Accident 
On February 12, 2009, Cogan Air Flight 3407 crashed at Buffalo, New York 
killing all 49 aboard the aircraft and one on the ground.  The flight was operating 
in instrument flight conditions at night in icing conditions.  The flight crew was 
composed of an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) rated captain, age 47, with 3,379 
hours of flight time and a first officer, age 24, with 2,244 flight hours.  The 
aircraft was a Bombardier Q-400 twin-engine turboprop. 
 
When the aircraft received a clearance to begin an approach, the pilot reduced 
power and as the airspeed began to diminish, the crew began to configure the 
aircraft for landing.  The airspeed continued to decrease until the pilot felt the 
stick shaker begin to react.  The “stick-shaker” is a warning to the crew that the 
airplane is approaching an aerodynamic stall; the control wheel and yoke (stick) 
actually physically trembles.  When this occurred, the captain pulled back on the 
control wheel, while the correct action is to push forward.  As the airplane began 
to roll off on a wing, the pilot pulled harder, four times, each harder than the last.  
He was not able to recover the aircraft from the stall and it crashed into a house 
three miles short of the runway.  The National Transportation Safety Board’s 
(NTSB) investigation concluded, “The captain’s response to stick shaker 
activation should have been automatic, but his improper flight control inputs were 
inconsistent with his training and were instead consistent with startle and 
confusion” (NTSB, 2009, p. 89).  The NTSB also concluded, “The probable cause 
of this accident was the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of the 
stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not 
recover” (p. 155). 
 
It is interesting to note that in the NTSB report there were no recommendations 
regarding the achievement of the ATP or the accumulation of flight time.  The 
Captain held an ATP certificate and the First Officer was old enough (minimum 
requirements for the ATP was age 23) and had enough flight time (minimum 
flight time was 1,500 flight hours) to hold an ATP.  Nevertheless, even before the 
NTSB had completed the investigation, Congress overreacted.    
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Congressional Reaction to the Cogan Accident 
By June of 2009, Congress (the House) had put together H.R. 3371, the Airline 
Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act of 2009.  This act required that all 
pilots entering airline service must have earned the ATP.  This means that each 
pilot would have to be at least 23 years of age and have logged at least 1,500 
hours of flight time.  This was a five-fold increase over the previous requirements, 
which, on average, were about 300 hours.  As this proposal began to be circulated, 
many in aviation higher education became very alarmed that the legislation was 
attempting to solve a non-existent problem and was likely to achieve the inverse 
of its goal.  In a letter to a Congressman, representatives from one university 
stated, “While we do support this effort, we also want to alert you to a provision 
in H.R. 3371 . . .that may have a detrimental impact on airline safety and pilot 
training – the opposite effect of the bill’s intent” (Johnson, 2009).  The provision 
being described is one that required pilots in airline service to possess the ATP. 
 
The leadership of the two primary aviation education organizations – the 
University Aviation Association (UAA) and the Aviation Accreditation Board 
International (AABI) – began to organize to fight against the provision.  
Representatives from this group met with House Aviation Subcommittee staff 
members on September 3, 2009 and with subcommittee members on September 
15.  The group was invited to send a representative to testify before the House 
Aviation Subcommittee hearing on September 23, 2009.  The individual chosen 
was a well-established aviation educator who had previously been the President of 
each of the UAA and AABI organizations.  The title of his testimony was Quality 
not Quantity.  Referring to graduates of university/college aviation pilot education 
programs he said: 
I submit that there is a direct relationship between quality and safety.  The 
higher the quality of the entering pilot work force, the higher the level of 
safety.  But the ATP-only provision in this bill would close the cockpit 
doors to these high quality entry level first officers. (The Federal Aviation 
Administration’s Call to Action, 2009, p. 15) 
Within two weeks after the hearing, the ranking minority party member of the 
subcommittee asked the educator group to submit amending language to the bill 
to address member concerns.  This was accomplished and after several iterations, 
the following language was inserted into the bill: 
(d) Credit Toward Flight Hours. – The Administrator may allow specific 
academic training courses, beyond those required under subsection (b) (2), 
to be credited toward the total flight hours required under subsection (c). 
(Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act of 2009. Section II, 
2009) 
This means that the FAA Administrator was given the authority to deviate from 
the ATP requirements (1,500 hours; age 23) on the basis of academic training 
should he judge that it was appropriate.  This required that the FAA convene an 
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC), which occurred in in July 2010.  The 
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ARC was composed of several groups with an interest in pilot education and 
training, including Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), Air Transport Association 
(ATA), Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), Aviation Accreditation 
Board International (AABI), Coalition of Airline Pilots Association (CAPA), 
National Air Disaster Alliance/Foundation (NADA/F), Pilot Career Initiative 
(PCA), Regional Air Cargo Carriers Association (RACCA), and Regional Airline 
Association (RAA) (FOQARC Report, 2010).  AABI chose its executive director 
and the same individual who had testified before Congress as its representatives to 
the ARC.   Shortly after the FOQARC began, H.R. 3371, which had now become 
H.R. 5900, was passed into law, becoming Public Law (PL) 111-216 (Airline 
Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010). 
 
Several recommendations were made by the FOQARC to the FAA.  Among those 
was a graduated scale for awarding flight time credits for academic training 
courses.  Those at the high end of the scale were pilots who had been graduated 
from four-year accredited aviation programs, had achieved the Certified Flight 
Instructor certificated for Instrument and Multi-engine, had taken an advanced jet 
training course as part of their curriculum, and had accumulated some flight 
instructor time.  Pilots with these qualifications could be qualified to enter airline 
service with as little as about 550 flight hours.  Pilots who had been graduated 
from a non-collegiate but structured program and had all of the other 
qualifications could enter airline service at about 750 hours.  The low end of the 
spectrum was a pilot who had none of these qualifications; that person would 
need the full 1,500 hours (FOQARC Report, 2010).   
 
Another important recommendation was related to the level of simulation required 
to implement the training recommendations.  In general, the higher the level, the 
more the device mimics the actual aircraft.  Numbered levels are used to describe 
only non-motion simulators.  Simulators capable of movement are known as full-
flight simulators and are designated by letters such as A, B, C, D.  Simulators 
designated as “D” are more capable than those designated as “C.”   The term that 
encompasses both motion and non-motion simulators is FSTD (Flight Simulation 
Training Devices).  The ARC described the recommended simulation level in its 
definition of an Advanced Jet Training course: “an AJT course must employ a 
level 5 or greater flight training device for students to receive the aeronautical 
experience credit . . .” (FOQARC Report, 2010, p. 78).  The FAA was under no 
obligation to adopt any of the ARC’s recommendations. 
 
The Resulting FAA Rulemaking Activities 
Prior to publishing a rule, the FAA issues a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM).  All who wish to comment on a rule’s provisions are free to submit 
comments to the FAA.  The NPRM concerning the use of simulation for First 
Officer training was published in February 2012 and titled, Pilot Certification and 
Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations.  In this document, the 
FAA proposed that “at least 8 hours of training in a Level C or higher full flight 
simulator…” (p.105) would be required for certification. 
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During the open comment period, a national conference, the National Training 
Aircraft Symposium (NTAS), was held to discuss issues related to the NPRM.  
The conference had attendees from the airlines, aviation education institutions, 
flight trainers and others interested in preparing professional pilots.  A number of 
questions were asked in which each attendee could respond via a cell phone, 
including, “If FSTD training is required what level of FSTD is appropriate” 
(Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, 2012, slide 49).  Sixty-five percent 
responded that a level 5 or above was sufficient; another 33% stated that devices 
below level 5 were acceptable.  Only 2% responded that a full-flight simulator 
was appropriate.  These results were reported to the FAA via responses to the 
NPRM on behalf of NTAS. 
  
Yet, despite the recommendations from the FOQ ARC, the National Training 
Aircraft Symposium, and many others, the requirements of the rule published July 
2013, stated that candidates for First Officer positions with the airlines would 
need to train in a full-flight simulator, specifically:  
15. FSTD TRAINING TOPICS. As stated in § 61.156(b), the ATP CTP 
must include at least ten hours of training in an FSTD, qualified under 14 
CFR part 60. Of the ten required hours, at least six hours of training must 
be completed in a full flight simulator (FFS), Level C or higher. (FAA, 
2013) 
 
Implementing the New Rule in a Collegiate Environment 
While the new rule does not require college or university professional pilot degree 
programs to provide training for the ATP CTP (Airline Transport Pilot 
Certification Training Program), many such institutions take great pride in 
preparing professional pilots for first officer positions as a function of the 
curriculum.  To do so, institutions may need to acquire a full-flight simulator or 
partner with a simulator training provider.  In the first instance, even a good used 
full-flight simulator for a type of aircraft currently in service with the airlines will 
cost upwards of $7 million (see Figure 1).  Thus, for many institutions, the latter 
approach is the better option.  In both cases, the financial burden falls upon the 
student who will likely pay from $5,000 to $10,000 for the ATP CTP course.  
This is in addition to the flight training fees that already total nearly $40,000.   
 
In sum, because of congressional over-reaction, a collegiate system which 
produced excellent first officer candidates who had below 500 flight hours and 
who had been demonstrated scientifically to be efficient, skilled, and safe, was 
upended.  The flight hour requirements were increased five-fold with little regard 
to its impact on the pilot pool.  Congressional legislation forced the FAA to create 
and publish new rules that were unmindful of the simulation recommendations of 
professional pilot groups and required virtual simulation technology new to the 
college/university training environment. At the bottom of this forced technology 
totem pole is the student. 
 



























As a side note, it is disheartening to note that because of these new flight time 
requirements, the pool of available of pilots has shrunk, forcing some airlines to 
curtail commitments.  For example, as recently reported by Everdeen Mason 
(2014) referring to Republic Airways Holdings Inc. in the Wall Street Journal 
online: 
 
The regional airline company said in a regulatory filing Tuesday that it has 
41 ERJ aircraft with leases set to expire this year and intended to seek 
extensions. But because of the congressionally mandated rule that requires 
pilots to have 1,500 hours of experience, there aren't enough qualified 
pilots and it won't seek extensions for all the aircraft (p. 1). 
 
Further, the new flight time requirements have already begun to cause shortages 
of qualified first officer candidates.  The result is that regional airlines are 
beginning to curtail service to several communities.  For example, “Great Lakes 
Airlines ended service to a half-dozen small towns on Feb. 1 after seeing its pilot 
ranks slashed from more than 300 to fewer than 100” (Bachman, 2014).  
 
Figure 1.   A CRJ 200 full-flight simulator.  This is typical of those required 
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